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Abstract
We introduce a new model for studying quantum data structure problems — the
quantum cell probe model. We prove a lower bound for the static predecessor problem
in the address-only version of this model where we allow quantum parallelism only
over the ‘address lines’ of the queries. The address-only quantum cell probe model
subsumes the classical cell probe model, and many quantum query algorithms like
Grover’s algorithm fall into this framework. Our lower bound improves the previous
known lower bound for the predecessor problem in the classical cell probe model with
randomised query schemes, and matches the classical deterministic upper bound of
Beame and Fich [BF99]. Beame and Fich [BF99] have also proved a matching lower
bound for the predecessor problem, but only in the classical deterministic setting.
Our lower bound has the advantage that it holds for the more general quantum
model, and also, its proof is substantially simpler than that of Beame and Fich.
We prove our lower bound by obtaining a round elimination lemma for quantum
communication complexity. A similar lemma was proved by Miltersen, Nisan, Safra
and Wigderson [MNSW98] for classical communication complexity, but it was not
strong enough to prove a lower bound matching the upper bound of Beame and
Fich. Our quantum round elimination lemma also allows us to prove rounds versus
communication tradeoffs for some quantum communication complexity problems like
the ‘greater-than’ problem.
We also study the static membership problem in the quantum cell probe model.
Generalising a result of Yao [Yao81], we show that if the storage scheme is implicit,
that is it can only store members of the subset and ‘pointers’, then any quantum
query scheme must make Ω(log n) probes.
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1 Introduction
A static data structure problem consists of a set of data D, a set of queries Q, a set of
answers A, and a function f : D × Q → A. The aim is to store the data efficiently and
succinctly, so that any query can be answered with only a few probes to the data structure.
In a seminal paper [Yao81], Yao introduced the (classical) cell probe model for studying
static data structure problems (in the classical setting). Thereafter, this model has been
used extensively to prove (classical) upper and lower bounds for several data structure
problems (see e.g. [FKS84, MNSW98, BF99, BMRV00]). A classical (s, w, t) cell probe
scheme for f has two components: a storage scheme and a query scheme. Given the data
d ∈ D to be stored, the storage scheme stores it as a table Td of s cells, each cell w bits
long. w is called the word size of the scheme. The query scheme has to answer queries.
Given a query q ∈ Q, the query scheme computes the answer f(d, q) to that query by
making at most t probes to the stored table Td, where each probe reads one cell at a time.
The storage scheme is deterministic whereas the query scheme can be deterministic or
randomised. The goal is to study tradeoffs between s, t and w. For an overview of results
in this model, see the survey by Miltersen [Mil99].
In this paper, we study static data structure problems, such as the static member-
ship problem and the static predecessor problem, when the query algorithm is allowed to
query the table using a quantum superposition. We formalise this by defining the quan-
tum cell probe model similar to the quantum bit probe model of Radhakrishnan, Sen and
Venkatesh [RSV00]. Informally, in the quantum cell probe model, the storage scheme is
classical deterministic as before and stores the data d ∈ D as a table of cells Td; however,
the query scheme is quantum and can query the table Td using a quantum superposition.
We show a lower bound for the predecessor problem in a restricted version of this model,
which we call the address-only quantum cell probe model. In the predecessor problem, the
storage scheme has to store a subset S of size at most n from the universe [m], such that
given any query element x ∈ [m], one can quickly find the predecessor of x in S.
Result 1 (Lower bound for predecessor, informal statement) Suppose
we have an address-only quantum cell probe solution with constant probability
of error for the static predecessor problem, where the universe size is m and the
subset size is at most n, using nO(1) cells of storage with word size (logm)O(1)
bits. Then the number of queries is at least Ω
(
log logm
log log logm
)
as a function of m,
and at least Ω
(√
logn
log logn
)
as a function of n.
We then consider the static membership problem. Here one has to answer membership
queries instead of predecessor queries. Yao [Yao81] showed that if the universe is large
enough, any classical cell probe solution with an implicit deterministic storage scheme
and a deterministic query scheme for the static membership problem must make Ω(log n)
probes to the table in the worst case. An implicit storage scheme either stores a ‘pointer
value’ (viz. a value which is not an element of the universe) or an element of S in a cell.
In particular, it is not allowed to store an element of the universe which is not a member
of S. We generalise Yao’s result to the quantum setting.
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Result 2 (Lower bound for membership, informal statement) Suppose
we have a quantum cell probe solution with an implicit storage scheme for the
static membership problem. Then, if the universe is large enough compared to
the number of cells of storage, the size of the universe of ‘pointers’ and the size
of the stored subset, the query algorithm must make Ω(log n) probes, even if we
allow constant probability of error.
Remarks:
1. Our address-only quantum cell probe model subsumes the classical cell probe model
with randomised query schemes. Hence, our lower bound for the static predecessor problem
also holds in this setting. This improves the previous lower bound Ω(
√
log logm) as a
function of m and Ω(log1/3 n) as a function of n for this setting, shown by Miltersen,
Nisan, Safra and Wigderson [MNSW98]. Beame and Fich [BF99] have shown an upper
bound matching our lower bound up to constant factors, which uses nO(1) cells of storage
of word size O(logm) bits. In fact, both the storage and the query schemes are classical
deterministic in Beame and Fich’s solution. In their paper, Beame and Fich [BF99] also
show a lower bound of t = Ω
(
log logm
log log logm
)
as a function of m for (nO(1), 2(logm)
1−Ω(1)
, t)
classical deterministic cell probe schemes, and a lower bound of t = Ω
(√
logn
log logn
)
as a
function of n for (nO(1), (logm)O(1), t) classical deterministic cell probe schemes. But their
lower bound proof breaks down if the query scheme is randomised. Our result thus shows
that the upper bound scheme of Beame and Fich is optimal all the way up to the bounded
error address-only quantum cell probe model. Also, our proof is substantially simpler than
that of Beame and Fich.
2. It is known that querying in superposition gives a speed up over classical algorithms
for certain data retrieval problems, the most notable one being Grover’s algorithm [Gro96]
for searching an unordered list of n elements using O(
√
n) quantum queries. The power
of quantum querying for data structure problems was studied in the context of static
membership by Radhakrishnan, Sen and Venkatesh [RSV00]. In their paper, they worked
in the quantum bit probe model, which is our quantum cell probe model where the word
size is just one bit. They showed, roughly speaking, that quantum querying does not give
much advantage over classical schemes for the set membership problem. Our result above
seems to suggest that quantum search is perhaps not more powerful than classical search
for the predecessor problem as well.
3. In the next section, we formally describe the “address-only” restrictions we impose on
the query algorithm. Informally, they amount to this: we allow quantum parallelism over
the ‘address lines’ going into the table, but we have a fixed quantum state on the ‘data
lines’. This restriction on quantum querying does not make the model trivial. In fact,
many non-trivial quantum search algorithms, such as Grover’s algorithm [Gro96], Farhi
et al.’s algorithm [FGGS99], and Høyer et al.’s algorithm [HNS01], already satisfy these
restrictions.
4. For the static membership problem, Fredman, Komlo´s and Szemere´di [FKS84] have
shown a classical deterministic cell probe solution where the storage scheme uses O(n)
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cells of word size O(logm) bits, and the query scheme makes only a constant number of
probes. In this solution, the storage scheme may store elements of the universe in the table
which are not members of the subset to be stored. Hence the restriction that the storage
scheme be implicit is necessary for any such result. We note that implicit storage schemes
include many of the standard storage schemes like sorted array, hash table, search trees
etc.
1.1 Techniques
The lower bounds for the static membership problem shown in the quantum bit probe
model by Radhakrishnan et al. [RSV00] relied on linear algebraic techniques. Unfortu-
nately, these techniques appear to be powerless in the quantum cell probe model. In fact, to
show the lower bound above for the static predecessor problem, we use a connection between
quantum data structure problems and two-party quantum communication complexity, sim-
ilar to what was used by Miltersen, Nisan, Safra and Wigderson [MNSW98], and Beame
and Fich [BF99] for showing their (classical) lower bounds. Miltersen et al. [MNSW98]
proved a technical lemma in classical communication complexity called the round elimina-
tion lemma and derived from it lower bounds for various static data structure problems,
including the predecessor problem. But their round elimination lemma was not strong
enough to prove a lower bound matching the upper bound of Beame and Fich. In this
paper we prove a stronger (!) round elimination lemma for the quantum communica-
tion complexity model, which we then use to show a quantum lower bound for the static
predecessor problem matching Beame and Fich’s upper bound. Our quantum round elimi-
nation lemma is proved using quantum information theoretic techniques. Inspired by these
techniques, we prove a still stronger round elimination lemma in classical communication
complexity.
We now give an informal description of the round elimination lemma. Suppose f :
E × F → G is a function. In the communication game corresponding to f , Alice gets a
string x ∈ E, Bob gets a string y ∈ F , and they have to communicate and compute f(x, y).
In the communication game f (n), Alice gets n strings x1, . . . , xn ∈ E; Bob gets an integer
i ∈ [n], a string y ∈ F , and a copy of the strings x1, . . . , xi−1. Their aim is to communicate
and compute f(xi, y). Suppose a quantum protocol for f
(n) is given where Alice starts, and
her first message is much smaller than n qubits. Intuitively, it would seem that since Alice
does not know i, the first round of communication cannot give much information about xi,
and thus, would not be very useful to Bob. Hence it should be possible to eliminate the
first round of communication, giving a quantum protocol for computing f(xi, y) where Bob
starts, with one less round of communication, and having the same message complexity and
similar error probability. The round elimination lemma justifies this intuition. Moreover,
we show that this is true even if Bob also gets copies of x1, . . . , xi−1, a case which is needed
in many applications.
Result 3 (Round elimination lemma, informal statement) A t round
quantum protocol for f (n) with Alice starting, where the first message of Alice is
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much smaller than n qubits, gives us a t−1 round quantum protocol for f where
Bob starts, with the same message complexity and similar error probability. An
analogous statement holds for classical randomised protocols.
Round reduction arguments have been given earlier in quantum communication com-
plexity, most notably by Klauck, Nayak, Ta-Shma and Zuckerman [KNTZ01]. However, for
technical reasons, the previous arguments do not go far enough to prove lower bounds for
the communication games arising from data structure problems like the predecessor prob-
lem. We need a technical quantum version of the round elimination lemma of Miltersen et
al. [MNSW98], to prove the desired quantum lower bounds.
The round elimination lemma also has applications to other communication complexity
problems, which might be interesting on their own. For example, it can be used to prove
rounds versus communication tradeoffs for the ‘greater-than’ problem. In the ‘greater-
than’ problem GTn, Alice is given x ∈ {0, 1}n, Bob is given y ∈ {0, 1}n, and they have to
communicate and decide whether x > y (treating x, y as integers).
Result 4 The t round bounded error quantum (classical randomised) commu-
nication complexity of GTn is Ω(n
1/tt−3) (Ω(n1/tt−2)).
There exists a bounded error classical randomised protocol for GTn using t rounds of com-
munication and having a complexity of O(n1/t log n). Hence, for a constant number of
rounds, our quantum lower bound matches the classical upper bound to within logarith-
mic factors. For one round quantum protocols, our result implies an Ω(n) lower bound for
GTn (which is optimal to within constant factors), improving upon the previous Ω(n/ log n)
lower bound of Klauck [Kla00]. No rounds versus communication tradeoff for this prob-
lem, for more than one round, was known earlier in the quantum setting. For classical
randomised protocols, Miltersen et al. [MNSW98] showed a lower bound of Ω(n1/t2−O(t))
using their round elimination lemma. If the number of rounds is unbounded, then there
is a classical randomised protocol for GTn using O(logn) rounds of communication and
having a complexity of O(logn) [Nis93]. An Ω(log n) lower bound for the bounded error
quantum communication complexity of GTn (irrespective of the number of rounds) follows
from Kremer’s result [Kre95] that the bounded error quantum communication complexity
of a function is lower bounded (up to constant factors) by the logarithm of the one round
(classical) deterministic communication complexity.
1.2 Organisation of the paper
Section 2 contains definitions of various terms that will be used throughout the paper. In
Section 3, we discuss some lemmas that will be needed in the proofs of the main theorems.
Section 4 contains a proof of the quantum and classical round elimination lemmas. Proofs of
some lemmas required to prove the round elimination lemma proper have been relegated
to the appendix. In Section 5, we apply our round elimination lemma to prove lower
bounds for the query complexity of the static predecessor problem and the communication
complexity of the ‘greater-than’ problem. Section 6 contains a proof of our lower bound
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for implicit storage quantum cell probe schemes for the static membership problem. We
conclude with a few remarks and some open problems in Section 7.
2 Definitions
In this section we define some of the terms which we will be using in this paper.
2.1 The quantum cell probe model
A quantum (s, w, t) cell probe scheme for a static data structure problem f : D ×Q→ A
has two components: a classical deterministic storage scheme that stores the data d ∈ D in
a table Td using s cells each containing w bits, and a quantum query scheme that answers
queries by ‘quantumly probing a cell at a time’ t times. Formally speaking, the table Td is
made available to the query algorithm in the form of an oracle unitary transform Od. To
define Od formally, we represent the basis states of the query algorithm as |j, b, z〉, where
j ∈ [s − 1] is a binary string of length log s, b is a binary string of length w, and z is a
binary string of some fixed length. Here, j denotes the address of a cell in the table Td, b
denotes the qubits which will hold the contents of a cell and z stands for the rest of the
qubits (‘work qubits’) in the query algorithm. Od maps |j, b, z〉 to |j, b ⊕ (Td)j , z〉, where
(Td)j is a bit string of length w and denotes the contents of the jth cell in Td. A quantum
query scheme with t probes is just a sequence of unitary transformations
U0 → Od → U1 → Od → . . . Ut−1 → Od → Ut
where Uj ’s are arbitrary unitary transformations that do not depend on d (representing the
internal computations of the query algorithm). For a query q ∈ Q, the computation starts
in a computational basis state |q〉|0〉, where we assume that the ancilla qubits are initially in
the basis state |0〉. Then we apply in succession, the operators U0, Od, U1, . . . , Ut−1, Od, Ut,
and measure the final state. The answer consists of the values on some of the output wires
of the circuit. We say that the scheme has worst case error probability less than ǫ if the
answer is equal to f(d, q), for every (d, q) ∈ D × Q, with probability greater than 1 − ǫ.
The term ‘bounded error quantum scheme’ means that ǫ = 1/3.
We now formally define the address-only quantum cell probe model. Here the storage
scheme is as in the general model, but the query scheme is restricted to be ‘address-only’.
This means that the state vector before a query to the oracle Od is always a tensor product
of a state vector on the address and work qubits (the (j, z) part in (j, b, z) above), and
a state vector on the data qubits (the b part in (j, b, z) above). The state vector on the
data qubits before a query to the oracle Od is independent of the query element q and
the data d but can vary with the probe number. Intuitively, we are only making use of
quantum parallelism over the address lines of a query. This mode of querying a table
subsumes classical querying, and also many non-trivial quantum algorithms like Grover’s
algorithm [Gro96], Farhi et al.’s algorithm [FGGS99], Høyer et al.’s algorithm [HNS01]
etc. satisfy the ‘address-only’ condition. For classical querying, the state vector on the
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data qubits is |0〉, independent of the probe number. For Grover and Farhi et al., the state
vector on the data qubit is (|0〉− |1〉)/√2, independent of the probe number. For Høyer et
al., the state vector on the data qubit is |0〉 for some probe numbers, and (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2
for the other probe numbers.
2.2 Quantum communication protocols
We consider two party quantum communication protocols as defined by Yao [Yao93]. Let
E, F,G be arbitrary finite sets and f : E × F → G be a function. There are two players
Alice and Bob, who hold qubits. When the communication game starts, Alice holds |x〉
where x ∈ E together with some ancilla qubits in the state |0〉, and Bob holds |y〉 where
y ∈ F together with some ancilla qubits in the state |0〉. Thus the qubits of Alice and
Bob are initially in computational basis states, and the initial superposition is simply
|x〉A|0〉A|y〉B|0〉B. Here the subscripts denote the ownership of the qubits by Alice and
Bob. The players take turns to communicate to compute f(x, y). Suppose it is Alice’s
turn. Alice can make an arbitrary unitary transformation on her qubits and then send one
or more qubits to Bob. Sending qubits does not change the overall superposition, but rather
changes the ownership of the qubits, allowing Bob to apply his next unitary transformation
on his original qubits plus the newly received qubits. At the end of the protocol, the last
recipient of qubits performs a measurement on the qubits in her possession to output an
answer. We say a quantum protocol computes f with ǫ-error in the worst case, if for any
input (x, y) ∈ E × F , the probability that the protocol outputs the correct result f(x, y)
is greater than 1− ǫ. The term ‘bounded error quantum protocol’ means that ǫ = 1/3.
We require that Alice and Bob make a secure copy of their inputs before beginning the
protocol. This is possible since the inputs to Alice and Bob are in computational basis
states. Thus, without loss of generality, the input qubits of Alice and Bob are never sent
as messages, their state remains unchanged throughout the protocol, and they are never
measured i.e. some work qubits are measured to determine the result of the protocol. We
call such protocols secure. We will assume henceforth that all our protocols are secure.
We now define the concept of a safe quantum protocol, which will be used in the
statement of the quantum round elimination lemma.
Definition 1 (Safe quantum protocol) A [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A ([t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
B) safe quan-
tum protocol is a secure quantum protocol where Alice (Bob) starts the communication, the
first message is l1 + c qubits long, the ith message, for i ≥ 2, is li qubits long, and the
communication goes on for t rounds. We think of the first message as having two parts:
the ‘main part’ which is l1 qubits long, and the ‘safe overhead part’ which is c qubits long.
The density matrix of the ‘safe overhead’ is independent of the inputs to Alice and Bob.
Later on in the paper, we also use the notation (t, c, a, b)A ((t, c, a, b)B) to denote a
[t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A ([t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
B) safe quantum protocol, where the per round message
lengths of Alice and Bob are a and b qubits respectively i.e. if Alice (Bob) starts, li = a
for i odd and li = b for i even (li = b for i odd and li = a for i even).
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Remark: The concept of a safe quantum protocol may look strange at first. The reason
we need to define it, intuitively speaking, is as follows. The communication games arising
from data structure problems often have an asymmetry between the message lengths of
Alice and Bob. This asymmetry is crucial to prove lower bounds on the number of rounds
of communication. In the previous quantum round reduction arguments (e.g. those of
Klauck et al. [KNTZ01]), the complexity of the first message in the protocol increases
quickly as the number of rounds is reduced and the asymmetry gets lost. This leads to
a problem where the first message soon gets big enough to potentially convey substantial
information about the input of one player to the other, destroying any hope of proving
strong lower bounds on the number of rounds. The concept of a safe protocol allows us
to get around this problem. We show through a careful quantum information theoretic
analysis of the round reduction process, that in a safe protocol, though the complexity of
the first message increases a lot, this increase is confined to the safe overhead and so, the
information content does not increase much. This is the key property which allows us to
prove a round elimination lemma for safe quantum protocols.
In this paper we will deal with quantum protocols with public coins. Intuitively, a
public coin quantum protocol is a probability distribution over finitely many (coinless)
quantum protocols. We shall henceforth call the standard definition of a quantum protocol
as coinless. Our definition is similar to the classical scenario, where a randomised protocol
with public coins is a probability distribution over finitely many deterministic protocols.
We note however, that our definition of a public coin quantum protocol is not the same
as that of a quantum protocol with prior entanglement, which has been studied previously
(see e.g. [CvDNT98]). Our definition is weaker, in that it does not allow the unitary
transformations of Alice and Bob to alter the ‘public coin’.
Definition 2 (Public coin quantum protocol) In a quantum protocol with a public
coin, there is, before the start of the protocol, a quantum state called a public coin, of
the form
∑
c
√
pc|c〉A|c〉B, where the subscripts denote ownership of qubits by Alice and
Bob, pc are finitely many non-negative real numbers and
∑
c pc = 1. Alice and Bob make
(entangled) copies of their respective halves of the public coin using CNOT gates before
commencing the protocol. The unitary transformations of Alice and Bob during the proto-
col do not touch the public coin. The public coin is never measured, nor is it ever sent as
a message.
Hence, one can think of the public coin quantum protocol to be a probability distribution,
with probability pc, over finitely many coinless quantum protocols indexed by the coin
basis states |c〉. A safe public coin quantum protocol is similarly defined as a probability
distribution over finitely many safe coinless quantum protocols.
Remarks:
1. We need to define public coin quantum protocols in order to make use of the harder
direction of Yao’s minimax lemma [Yao77]. The minimax lemma is the main tool which
allows us to convert ‘average case’ round reduction arguments to ‘worst case’ arguments.
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We need ‘worst case’ round reduction arguments in proving lower bounds for the rounds
complexity of communication games arising from data structure problems. This is because
many of these lower bound proofs use some notion of “self-reducibility”, arising from the
original data structure problem, which fails to hold in the ‘average case’ but holds for
the ‘worst case’. The quantum round reduction arguments of Klauck et al. [KNTZ01]
are ‘average case’ arguments, and this is one of the reasons why they do not suffice to
prove lower bounds for the rounds complexity of communication games arising from data
structure problems.
2. Parallel repetitions of protocols, as well as constructing new protocols from old ones
using both the directions of Yao’s minimax lemma, preserve the “safety” property.
For an input (x, y) ∈ E × F , we define the error ǫPx,y of the protocol P on (x, y), to be
the probability that the result of P on input (x, y) is not equal to f(x, y). For a protocol
P , given a probability distribution D on E × F , we define the average error ǫPD of P with
respect to D as the expectation over D of the error of P on inputs (x, y) ∈ E × F . We
define ǫP to be worst case error of P on inputs (x, y) ∈ E × F .
3 Preliminaries
In this section we state some facts which will be useful in what follows.
3.1 Yao’s minimax lemma
For completeness, we state Yao’s minimax lemma [Yao77] for safe quantum protocols in
the (slightly more general) flavour that will be required by us. The proof of this flavour of
the lemma is very similar to the standard proof, using the von Neumann minimax theorem.
Lemma 1 (Yao’s minimax lemma) Consider [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe quantum protocols P
for a function f : E × F → G. Let D denote a probability distribution on the inputs
(x, y) ∈ E × F . Then
inf
P : public coin
ǫP = sup
D
inf
P : coinless
ǫPD = sup
D
inf
P : public coin
ǫPD
Analogous properties hold for classical protocols too.
3.2 Quantum cell probe complexity and communication
In this subsection, we describe the connection between the quantum cell probe complexity
of a static data structure problem and the quantum communication complexity of an
associated communication game. Let f : D × Q → A be a static data structure problem.
Consider a two-party communication problem where Alice is given a query q ∈ Q, Bob is
given data d ∈ D, and they have to communicate and find out the answer f(d, q). We
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have the following lemma, which is a quantum analogue of a lemma of Miltersen [Mil94]
relating cell probe complexity to communication complexity in the classical setting.
Lemma 2 Suppose we have a quantum (s, w, t) cell probe solution to the static data struc-
ture problem f . Then we have a (2t, 0, log s+w, log s+w)A safe coinless quantum protocol
for the corresponding communication problem. If the query scheme is address-only, we can
get a (2t, 0, log s, log s + w)A safe coinless quantum protocol. The error probability of the
communication protocol is the same as that of the cell probe scheme.
Proof: Given a quantum (s, w, t) cell probe solution to the static data structure problem f ,
we can get a (2t, 0, log s+w, log s+w)A safe coinless quantum protocol for the corresponding
communication problem by just simulating the cell probe solution. If in addition, the query
scheme is address-only, the messages from Alice to Bob need consist only of the ‘address’
part. This can be seen as follows. Let the state vector of the data qubits before the ith
query be |θi〉. |θi〉 is independent of the query element and the stored data. Bob keeps t
special ancilla registers in states |θi〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ t at the start of the protocol P . These special
ancilla registers are in tensor with the rest of the qubits of Alice and Bob at the start of
P . Protocol P simulates the cell probe solution, but with the following modification. To
simulate the ith query of the cell probe solution, Alice prepares her ‘address’ and ‘data’
qubits as in the query scheme, but sends the ‘address’ qubits only. Bob treats those
‘address’ qubits together with |θi〉 in the ith special ancilla register as Alice’s query, and
performs the oracle table transformation on them. He then sends these qubits (both the
‘address’ as well as the ith special register qubits) to Alice. Alice exchanges the contents
of the ith special register with her ‘data’ qubits (i.e. exchanges the basis states), and
proceeds with the simulation of the query scheme. This gives us a (2t, 0, log s, log s+ w)A
safe coinless quantum protocol with the same error probability as that of the cell probe
query scheme.
In many natural data structure problems log s is much smaller than w and thus, in
the address-only quantum case, we get a (2t, 0, log s, O(w))A safe protocol. In the classical
setting, one gets a (2t, 0, log s, w)A protocol. This asymmetry in message lengths is crucial
in proving non-trivial lower bounds on t. The concept of a safe quantum protocol helps us
in exploiting this asymmetry.
3.3 Background from quantum information theory
In this subsection, we discuss some basic facts from quantum information theory that will
be used in the proof of the round elimination lemma. We follow the notation of Klauck,
Nayak, Ta-Shma and Zuckerman’s paper [KNTZ01]. For a good account of quantum
information theory, see the book by Nielsen and Chuang [NC00].
If A is a quantum system with density matrix ρ, then S(A)
∆
= S(ρ)
∆
= −Tr ρ log ρ is
the von Neumann entropy of A. If A,B are two disjoint quantum systems, their mutual
information is defined as I(A : B)
∆
= S(A)+S(B)−S(AB). We now state some properties
about von Neumann entropy and mutual information which will be useful later. The
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proofs follow easily from the definitions, using basic properties of von Neumann entropy
like subadditivity and triangle inequality (see e.g. [NC00, Chapter 11]).
Lemma 3 Suppose A,B,C are disjoint quantum systems. Then
I(A : BC) = I(A : B) + I(AB : C)− I(B : C)
0 ≤ I(A : B) ≤ 2S(A)
If the Hilbert space of A has dimension d, then
0 ≤ S(A) ≤ log d
Suppose X,Q are disjoint quantum systems with finite dimensional Hilbert spaces H,K
respectively. For every computational basis state |x〉 ∈ H, suppose σx is a density matrix in
K. Suppose the density matrix of (X,Q) is ∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗σx, where px > 0 and ∑x px = 1.
Thus X is in a mixed state {px, |x〉}, and we shall say that X is a classical random variable
and that Q is a quantum encoding |x〉 7→ σx of X . Define σ ∆= ∑x pxσx. σ is the reduced
density matrix of Q, and we shall say that σ is the the density matrix of the average
encoding. Then, S(XQ) = S(X)+
∑
x pxS(σx), and hence, I(X : Q) = S(σ)−
∑
x pxS(σx).
Let X, Y,Q be disjoint quantum systems with finite dimensional Hilbert spaces H,K,L
respectively. Let x ∈ H, y ∈ K be computational basis vectors. For every |x〉|y〉 ∈ H ⊗K,
suppose σxy is a density matrix in L. Let Z refer to the quantum system (X, Y ). Suppose
(X, Y, Z) has density matrix
∑
x,y pxy|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ σxy, where pxy > 0 and
∑
x,y pxy = 1.
Thus, X and Y are classical random variables, and Z = XY is in a mixed state {pxy, |x〉|y〉}.
Q is a quantum encoding |xy〉 7→ σxy of Z. Define qxy to be the (conditional) probability
that Y = y given that X = x. |y〉 7→ σxy can be thought of as a quantum encoding Qx
of Y given that X = x. The joint density matrix of (Y,Qx) is
∑
y q
x
y |y〉〈y| ⊗ σxy. We let
I((Y : Q)|X = x) denote the mutual information of this encoding.
We now prove the following propositions.
Proposition 1 Let M1,M2 be disjoint finite dimensional quantum systems. Suppose M
∆
=
(M1,M2) is a quantum encoding |x〉 7→ σx of a classical random variable X. Suppose the
density matrix of M2 is independent of X i.e. TrM1 σx is the same for all x. Let M1 be
supported on a qubits. Then, I(X : M) ≤ 2a.
Proof: By Lemma 3, I(X : M) = I(X : M1M2) = I(X : M2)+I(XM2 : M1)−I(M2 : M1).
But since the density matrix of M2 is independent of X , I(X : M2) = 0. Hence, by again
using Lemma 3, we get that I(X :M) ≤ I(XM2 : M1) ≤ 2S(M1) ≤ 2a.
Remarks:
1. This proposition is the key observation allowing us to “ignore” the size of the “safe”
overhead M2 in the round elimination lemma. It will be very useful in the applications of
the round elimination lemma, where the complexity of the first message in the protocol
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increases quickly, but the blow up is confined to the “safe” overhead. Earlier round re-
duction arguments were unable to handle this large blow up in the complexity of the first
message.
2. In the above proposition, if M is a classical encoding of X (i.e. an encoding |x〉 7→ σx,
where σx is a density matrix of a mixture of computational basis vectors), we get the
improved inequality I(X : M) ≤ a.
The next proposition has been observed by Klauck et al. [KNTZ01].
Proposition 2 Suppose M is a quantum encoding of a classical random variable X. Sup-
pose X = X1X2 . . .Xn, where the Xi are classical independent random variables. Then,
I(X1 . . .Xn : M) =
∑n
i=1 I(Xi : MX1 . . .Xi−1).
Proof: The proof is by induction on n, using Lemma 3 repeatedly. We also use the fact
that I(Xi : Xi+1 . . .Xn) = 0 for 1 ≤ i < n, since X1, . . . , Xn are independent classical
random variables.
Proposition 3 Let X, Y be classical random variables and M be a quantum encoding of
(X, Y ). Then, I(Y :MX) = I(X : Y ) + EX [I((Y : M)|X = x)].
Proof: Let σxy be the density matrix of M when X, Y = x, y. Let px be the (marginal)
probability that X = x and qxy the (conditional) probability that Y = y given X = x.
Define σx
∆
=
∑
y q
x
yσxy. We now have
I(Y : MX) = S(Y ) + S(MX)− S(MXY )
= S(Y ) + S(X) +
∑
x
pxS(σx)− (S(XY ) +
∑
x,y
pxq
x
yS(σxy))
= I(X : Y ) +
∑
x
px(S(σx)−
∑
y
qxyS(σxy))
= I(X : Y ) +
∑
x
pxI((Y : M)|X = x)
= I(X : Y ) + EX [I((Y : M)|X = x)]
4 The round elimination lemmas
In this section we prove our round elimination lemmas for safe public coin quantum proto-
cols and public coin classical randomised protocols. Since a public coin quantum protocol
can be converted to a coinless quantum protocol at the expense of an additional “safe”
overhead in the first message, we also get a similar round elimination lemma for coinless
protocols. We can decrease the overhead to logarithmic in the total bit size of the inputs
by a technique similar to the public to private coins conversion for classical randomised
protocols [New91]. But since the statement of the round elimination lemma is cleanest
for safe public coin quantum protocols, we give it below for such protocols only. Similar
remarks apply to the classical setting.
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4.1 The quantum round elimination lemma
In this subsection we prove our round elimination lemma for safe public coin quantum
protocols. We first state the following round reduction lemma, which can be proved in a
manner similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4 in Klauck et al. [KNTZ01], but with a careful
accounting of “safe” overheads in the messages communicated by Alice and Bob. Intuitively
speaking, the lemma says that if the first message of Alice carries little information about
her input, under some probability distribution on inputs, then it can be eliminated, giving
rise to a protocol where Bob starts, with one less round of communication, and the same
message complexity and similar error probability, with respect to the same probability
distribution on inputs. We observe, in the lemma below, that though there is a overhead
of l1 + c qubits on the first message of Bob, it is a “safe” overhead.
Lemma 4 Suppose f : E × F → G is a function. Let D be a probability distribution on
E × F , and P be a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]A safe coinless quantum protocol for f . Let X stand for
the classical random variable denoting Alice’s input (under distribution D), M be the first
message of Alice in the protocol P , and I(X : M) denote the mutual information between
X and M under distribution D. Then there exists a [t− 1, c + l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe coinless
quantum protocol Q for f , such that
ǫQD ≤ ǫPD + ((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/4
A proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
We can now prove the quantum round elimination lemma (for the communication game
f (n)).
Lemma 5 (Quantum round elimination lemma) Suppose f : E × F → G is a func-
tion. Suppose the communication game f (n) has a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe public coin quantum
protocol with worst case error less than δ. Then there is a [t − 1, c + l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe
public coin quantum protocol for f with worst case error less than ǫ
∆
= δ + (4l1 ln 2/n)
1/4.
Proof: Suppose the given protocol for f (n) has worst case error δ˜ < δ. Define ǫ˜
∆
=
δ˜ + (4l1 ln 2/n)
1/4. To prove the quantum round elimination lemma it suffices to give, by
the harder direction of the minimax lemma (Lemma 1), for any probability distribution
D on E × F , a [t − 1, c + l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe public coin quantum protocol P for f with
average distributional error ǫPD ≤ ǫ˜ < ǫ. To this end, we will first construct a probability
distribution D∗ on En × [n]× F as follows. Choose i ∈ [n] uniformly at random. Choose
independently, for each j ∈ [n], (xj, yj) ∈ E × F according to distribution D. Set y = yi
and throw away yj, j 6= i. By the easier direction of the minimax lemma (Lemma 1), we
get a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe coinless quantum protocol P ∗ for f (n) with distributional error,
ǫP
∗
D∗ ≤ δ˜ < δ. In P ∗, Alice gets x1, . . . , xn, Bob gets i, y and x1, . . . , xi−1. We shall construct
the desired protocol P from the protocol P ∗.
Let M be the first message of Alice in P ∗. By the definition of a safe protocol, M has
two parts: M1 l1 qubits long, and the “safe” overhead M2, c qubits long. Let the input
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to Alice be denoted by the classical random variable X = X1X2 . . .Xn where Xi is the
classical random variable corresponding to the ith input to Alice. Let the classical random
variable Y denote the input y of Bob. Define ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
to be the average error of P ∗
under distribution D∗ when i is fixed and X1, . . . , Xi−1 are fixed to x1, . . . , xi−1. Using
Propositions 1, 2, 3 and the fact that under distribution D∗, X1, . . . , Xn are independent
classical random variables, we get that
2l1
n
≥ I(X:M)
n
= Ei[I(Xi : MX1, . . . , Xi−1)]
= Ei,X [I((Xi : M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1)]
(1)
Also
δ˜ ≥ ǫP ∗D∗ = Ei,X
[
ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
]
(2)
The expectations above are under distribution D∗.
For any i ∈ [n], x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ E, define the [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]A safe coinless quantum
protocol P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 for the function f as follows. Alice is given x ∈ E and Bob is given
y ∈ F . Bob sets i to the given value, and both Alice and Bob set X1, . . . , Xi−1 to the
values x1, . . . , xi−1. Alice puts an independent copy of a pure state |ψ〉 (defined below)
for each of the inputs Xi+1, . . . , Xn. She sets Xi = x and Bob sets Y = y. Then they
run protocol P ∗ on these inputs. Here |ψ〉 ∆= ∑x∈E√px|x〉, where px is the (marginal)
probability of x under distribution D. Since P ∗ is a safe coinless quantum protocol, so is
P ′i;x1,...,xi−1. Because P
∗ is a secure protocol, the probability that P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 makes an error
for an input (x, y), ǫ
P ′
i;x1,...,xi−1
x,y , is the average probability of error of P ∗ under distribution
D∗ when i is fixed to the given value, X1, . . . , Xi−1 are fixed to x1, . . . , xi−1, and Xi, Y are
fixed to x, y. Hence, the average probability of error of P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 under distribution D
ǫ
P ′
i;x1,...,xi−1
D = ǫ
P ∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
(3)
Let M ′ denote the first message of P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 and X
′ denote the register Xi holding the
input x to Alice. Because of the “secureness” of P ∗, the density matrix of (X ′,M ′) in
protocol P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 is the same as the density matrix of (Xi,M) in protocol P
∗ when
X1, . . . , Xi−1 are set to x1, . . . , xi−1. Hence
I(X ′ : M ′) = I((Xi :M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1) (4)
Using Lemma 4 and equations (3) and (4), we get a [t−1, c+ l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe coinless
quantum protocol Pi;x1,...,xi−1 for f with
ǫ
Pi;x1,...,xi−1
D ≤ ǫ
P ′
i;x1,...,xi−1
D + ((2 ln 2)I(X
′ : M ′))1/4
= ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
+ ((2 ln 2)I((Xi : M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1))1/4
(5)
We now construct a [t− 1, c+ l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe public coin quantum protocol P for f ,
which is nothing but a probability distribution (under D∗) over the safe coinless quantum
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protocols Pi;x1,...,xi−1, i ∈ [n], x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ E. For protocol P , we get (note that the
expectations below are under distribution D∗)
ǫPD = Ei,X
[
ǫ
Pi;x1,...,xi−1
D
]
≤ Ei,X
[
ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
+ ((2 ln 2)I((Xi : M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1))1/4
]
≤ Ei,X
[
ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
]
+ ((2 ln 2)Ei,X [I((Xi : M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1)])1/4
≤ δ˜ +
(
4l1 ln 2
n
)1/4
= ǫ˜
The first inequality follows from (5), the second inequality follows from the concavity of
the fourth root function and the last inequality from from (1) and (2).
This completes the proof of the quantum round elimination lemma.
4.2 The classical round elimination lemma
The proof of the classical round elimination lemma is similar to that of the quantum round
elimination lemma. First, we have the following classical analogue of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 Suppose f : E × F → G is a function. Let D be a probability distribution on
E × F , and P be a [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]A private coin classical randomised protocol for f . Let X
stand for the classical random variable denoting Alice’s input (under distribution D), M be
the first message of Alice in the protocol P , and I(X : M) denote the mutual information
between X and M under distribution D. Then there exists a [t−1, 0, l2, . . . , lt]B public coin
classical randomised protocol Q for f , such that
ǫQD ≤ ǫPD +
1
2
((2 ln 2)I(X :M))1/2
A proof of the lemma is given in the appendix.
We can now prove the classical round elimination lemma (for the communication game
f (n)).
Lemma 7 (Classical round elimination lemma) Suppose f : E × F → G is a func-
tion. Suppose the communication game f (n) has a [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]
A public coin classical
randomised protocol with worst case error less than δ. Then there is a [t− 1, 0, l2, . . . , lt]B
public coin classical randomised protocol for f with worst case error less than ǫ
∆
= δ +
(1/2)(2l1 ln 2/n)
1/2.
Proof: (Sketch) The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5, but using Lemma 6 instead
of Lemma 4. Suppose the given protocol for f (n) has worst case error δ˜ < δ. Define
ǫ˜
∆
= δ˜ + (1/2)(2l1 ln 2/n)
1/2. To prove the classical round elimination lemma it suffices
to give, by the harder direction of the minimax lemma (Lemma 1), for any probability
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distribution D on E × F , a [t − 1, 0, l2, . . . , lt]B public coin classical randomised protocol
P for f with average distributional error ǫPD ≤ ǫ˜ < ǫ. To this end, we construct the
probability distribution D∗ on En × [n] × F as before. By the easier direction of the
minimax lemma (Lemma 1), we get a [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]
A classical deterministic protocol P ∗
for f (n) with distributional error, ǫP
∗
D∗ ≤ δ˜ < δ. In P ∗, Alice gets x1, . . . , xn ∈ E, Bob gets
i ∈ [n], y ∈ F and a copy of x1, . . . , xi−1. We shall construct the desired protocol P from
the protocol P ∗.
Let M be the first message of Alice in P ∗. Let the input to Alice be denoted by
the classical random variable X = X1X2 . . .Xn where Xi is the classical random variable
corresponding to the ith input to Alice. Let the classical random variable Y denote the
input y of Bob. Define ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
to be the average error of P ∗ under distribution D∗
when i is fixed and X1, . . . , Xi−1 are fixed to x1, . . . , xi−1. Arguing as before, we get
l1
n
= Ei,X [I((Xi : M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1)]
Also
δ˜ ≥ ǫP ∗D∗ = Ei,X
[
ǫP
∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
]
The expectations above are under distribution D∗.
For any i ∈ [n], x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ E, define the [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]A private coin classical
randomised protocol P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 for the function f as follows. Alice is given x ∈ E and Bob
is given y ∈ F . Bob sets i to the given value, and both Alice and Bob set X1, . . . , Xi−1
to the values x1, . . . , xi−1. Alice tosses her private coin to choose Xi+1, . . . , Xn ∈ E, where
each Xj, i + 1 ≤ j ≤ n is chosen independently according to the (marginal) distribution
on E induced by D. Alice sets Xi = x and Bob sets Y = y. Then they run protocol
P ∗ on these inputs. The probability that P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 makes an error for an input (x, y),
ǫ
P ′
i;x1,...,xi−1
x,y , is the average probability of error of P ∗ under distribution D∗ when i is fixed to
the given value, X1, . . . , Xi−1 are fixed to x1, . . . , xi−1, and Xi, Y are fixed to x, y. Hence,
the average probability of error of P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 under distribution D
ǫ
P ′
i;x1,...,xi−1
D = ǫ
P ∗
D∗;i;x1,...,xi−1
Let M ′ denote the first message of P ′i;x1,...,xi−1 and X
′ denote the register Xi holding the
input x to Alice. Then
I(X ′ : M ′) = I((Xi :M)|X1, . . . , Xi−1 = x1, . . . , xi−1)
Using Lemma 6 and arguing as before, we can complete the proof of the classical round
elimination lemma.
5 Applications of the round elimination lemma
In this section, we apply our round elimination lemmas to prove lower bounds for the query
complexity of the static predecessor problem, and rounds versus communication tradeoffs
for the ‘greater-than’ problem.
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5.1 Static predecessor problem
The proof of our lower bound for the static predecessor problem in the address-only quan-
tum cell probe model is similar to the classical proof in Miltersen et al. [MNSW98]. But
because we use a stronger round elimination lemma, we can prove stronger lower bounds.
We start by some preliminary observations.
Definition 3 (Rank parity communication games, [MNSW98]) In the rank parity
communication game PARp,q, Alice is given a bit string x of length p, Bob is given a set S
of bit strings of length p, |S| ≤ q, and they have to communicate and decide whether the
rank of x in S (treating the bit strings as integers) is odd or even. By the rank of x in S,
we mean the cardinality of the set {y ∈ S | y ≤ x}. In the game PAR(k),Ap,q , Alice is given
k bit strings x1, . . . , xk each of length p, Bob is given a set S of bit strings of length p,
|S| ≤ q, an index i ∈ [k], and a copy of x1, . . . , xi−1; they have to communicate and decide
whether the rank of xi in S is odd or even. In the game PAR
(k),B
p,q , Alice is given a bit string
x of length p and an index i ∈ [k], Bob is given k sets S1, . . . , Sk of bit strings of length p,
|Sj| ≤ q; they have to communicate and decide whether the rank of x in Si is odd or even.
Proposition 4 Let there be a (nO(1), (logm)O(1), t) address-only quantum cell probe solu-
tion to the static predecessor problem, where the universe size is m and the subset size is at
most n. Then there is a
(
2t+O(1), 0, O(logn), (logm)O(1)
)A
safe coinless (and hence, pub-
lic coin) quantum protocol for the rank parity communication game PARlogm,n. The error
probability of the communication protocol is the same as that of the cell probe scheme.
Proof: Consider the static rank parity data structure problem where the storage scheme
has to store a set S ⊆ [m], |S| ≤ n, and the query scheme, given a query x ∈ [m], has to
decide whether the rank of x in S is odd or even. Fredman, Komlo´s and Szemere´di [FKS84]
have shown the existence of two-level perfect hash tables containing, for each member y
of the stored subset S, y’s rank in S, and using O(n) cells of word size O(logm) and
requiring only O(1) classical deterministic cell probes. Combining a (nO(1), (logm)O(1), t)
address-only quantum cell probe solution to the static predecessor problem with such a
perfect hash table, gives us a (nO(1) +O(n),max((logm)O(1), O(logm)), t+O(1)) address-
only quantum cell probe solution to the static rank parity problem. The error prob-
ability of the cell probe scheme for the rank parity problem is the same as the error
probability of the cell probe scheme for the predecessor problem. By Lemma 2, we get
a (2t + O(1), 0, O(logn), (logm)O(1))A safe coinless quantum protocol for the rank parity
communication game PARlogm,n. The error probability of the communication protocol is
the same as that of the cell probe scheme for the predecessor problem.
Proposition 5 ([MNSW98]) Suppose k divides p. A communication protocol for PARp,q
with Alice starting, gives us a communication protocol for PAR
(k),A
p/k,q with Alice starting, with
the same message complexity, number of rounds and error probability.
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Proof: Consider the problem PAR
(k),A
p/k,q . Alice, who is given x1, . . . , xk, computes the
concatenation xˆ
∆
= x1 · x2 · · ·xk. Bob, who is given S, i and x1, . . . , xi−1, computes
Sˆ
∆
=
{
x1 · x2 · · ·xi−1 · y · 0p(1−i/k) | y ∈ S
}
Alice and Bob then run the protocol for PARp,q on the inputs xˆ, Sˆ to solve the problem
PAR
(k),A
p/k,q .
Proposition 6 ([MNSW98]) Suppose k divides q, and k is a power of 2. A commu-
nication protocol for PARp,q with Bob starting, gives us a communication protocol for
PAR
(k),B
p−log k−1,q/k with Bob starting, with the same message complexity, number of rounds
and error probability.
Proof: Consider the problem PAR
(k),B
p−log k−1,q/k. Alice, given x and i, computes xˆ
∆
= (i− 1) ·
0 · x. Bob, given S1, . . . , Sk, computes the sets S ′1, . . . , S ′k where
S ′j
∆
=
{ {(j − 1) · 0 · y | y ∈ Sj} if |Sj| is even
{(j − 1) · 0 · y | y ∈ Sj}⋃{(j − 1) · 1p−log k} if |Sj| is odd
Above, the integers (i− 1), (j − 1) are to be thought of as bit strings of length log k. Bob
also computes Sˆ
∆
=
⋃k
j=1 S
′
j . Alice and Bob then run the protocol for PARp,q on inputs xˆ,
Sˆ to solve the problem PAR
(k),B
p−log k−1,q/k.
We now prove the lower bound on the query complexity of static predecessor in the
address-only quantum cell probe model.
Theorem 1 Suppose we have a (nO(1), (logm)O(1), t) bounded error quantum address-only
cell probe solution to the static predecessor problem, where the universe size is m and the
subset size is at most n. Then the number of queries t is at least Ω
(
log logm
log log logm
)
as a function
of m, and at least Ω
(√
logn
log logn
)
as a function of n.
Proof: We basically imitate the proof of Miltersen et al. [MNSW98], but in our quantum
setting. By Proposition 4, it suffices to consider communication protocols for the rank
parity communication game PARlogm,n. Let n = 2
(log logm)2/ log log logm. Let c1
∆
= (4 ln 2)124.
For any given constants c2, c3 ≥ 1, define
a
∆
= c2 logn b
∆
= (logm)c3 t
∆
=
log logm
(c1 + c2 + c3) log log logm
We shall show that the rank parity communication game PARlogm,n does not have bounded
error (2t, 0, a, b)A safe public coin quantum protocols, thus proving the desired lower bounds
on the query complexity of static rank parity (and hence, static predecessor) by Lemma 2.
Given a (2t, 0, a, b)A safe public coin quantum protocol for PARlogm,n with error prob-
ability δ (δ < 1/3), we get a (2t, 0, a, b)A safe public coin quantum protocol for
PAR
(c1at4),A
logm
c1at
4 ,n
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with the same error probability δ, by Proposition 5. Using the quantum round elimination
lemma (Lemma 5), we get a (2t− 1, a, a, b)B safe public coin quantum protocol for
PAR logm
c1at
4 ,n
but the error probability increases to at most δ + (12t)−1. Using the reduction of Proposi-
tion 6, we get a (2t− 1, a, a, b)B safe public coin quantum protocol for
PAR
(c1bt4),B
logm
c1at
4−log(c1bt
4)−1, n
c1bt
4
with error probability at most δ + (12t)−1. From the given values of the parameters, we
see that
logm
(2c1at4)t
≥ log(c1bt4) + 1
This implies that we also have a (2t− 1, a, a, b)B safe public coin quantum protocol for
PAR
(c1bt4),B
logm
2c1at
4 ,
n
c1bt
4
with error probability at most δ + (12t)−1. Using the quantum round elimination lemma
(Lemma 5) again, we get a (2t− 2, a+ b, a, b)A safe public coin quantum protocol for
PAR logm
2c1at
4 ,
n
c1bt
4
but the error probability increases to at most δ + 2(12t)−1.
We do the above steps repeatedly. After applying the above steps i times, we get a
(2t− 2i, i(a+ b), a, b)A safe public coin quantum protocol for
PAR logm
(2c1at
4)i
, n
(c1bt
4)i
with error probability at most δ + 2i(12t)−1.
By applying the above steps t times, we finally get a (0, t(a+ b), a, b)A safe public coin
quantum protocol for
PAR logm
(2c1at
4)t
, n
(c1bt
4)t
with error probability at most δ+2t(12t)−1 < 1/2. From the given values of the parameters,
we see that
logm
(2c1at4)t
≥ (logm)Ω(1) n
(c1bt4)t
≥ nΩ(1)
Thus we get a zero round protocol for a rank parity problem on a non-trivial domain with
error probability less than 1/2, which is a contradiction.
In the above proof, we are tacitly ignoring “rounding off” problems. We remark that
this does not affect the correctness of the proof.
19
5.2 The ‘greater-than’ problem
Theorem 2 The t round bounded error quantum (classical randomised) communication
complexity of GTn is Ω(n
1/tt−3) (Ω(n1/tt−2)).
Proof: We recall the following reduction from GT
(k)
n/k to GTn (see [MNSW98]): In GT
(k)
n/k,
Alice is given x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}n/k, Bob is given i ∈ [k], y ∈ {0, 1}n/k, and copies of
x1, . . . , xi−1, and they have to communicate and decide if xi > y. To reduce GT
(k)
n/k to GTn,
Alice constructs x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n by concatenating x1, . . . , xk, Bob constructs y˜ ∈ {0, 1}n by
concatenating x1, . . . , xi−1, y, 1
n(1−i/k). It is easy to see that x˜ > y˜ iff xi > y.
Suppose GTn has a [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe public coin quantum protocol with worst case
error probability less than 1/3. Suppose
n ≥
(
Ct3(l1 + · · ·+ lt)
)t
where C = (4 ln 2)64. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, define
ki
∆
= Ct4li ni
∆
=
n∏i
j=1 kj
ǫi
∆
=
1
3
+
i∑
j=1
(
(4 ln 2)lj
kj
)1/4
Also define n0
∆
= n and ǫ0
∆
= 1/3. Then
ǫt
∆
=
1
3
+
t∑
j=1
(
(4 ln 2)lj
kj
)1/4
=
1
3
+
t
6t
= 1/2
and
nt =
n∏t
j=1 kj
=
n
(Ct4)tl1 · · · lt ≥
ntt
Ctt4t(l1 + · · ·+ lt)t ≥ 1
We now apply the above self-reduction and the quantum round elimination lemma
(Lemma 5) alternately. Before the ith stage, we have a [t − i + 1,∑i−1j=1 lj, li, . . . , lt]Z safe
public coin quantum protocol for GTni−1 with worst case error probability less than ǫi−1.
Here Z = A if i is odd, Z = B otherwise. For the ith stage, we apply the self-reduction
with k = ki. This gives us a [t− i+1,∑i−1j=1 lj , li, . . . , lt]Z safe public coin quantum protocol
for GT (ki)ni with the same error probability. We now apply the quantum round elimination
lemma (Lemma 5) to get a [t − i,∑ij=1 lj, li+1, . . . , lt]Z′ safe public coin quantum protocol
for GTni with worst case error probability less than ǫi. Here Z
′ = B if Z = A and Z ′ = A
if Z = B. This completes the ith stage.
Applying the self-reduction and the round elimination lemma alternately t times gives
us a zero round quantum protocol for the ‘greater-than’ problem on a domain of size nt > 1
with worst case error probability less than ǫt = 1/2, which is a contradiction.
In the above proof, we are tacitly ignoring “rounding off” problems. We remark that
this does not affect the correctness of the proof.
This proves the quantum lower bound of Ω(n1/tt−3) on the message complexity.
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Using the classical round elimination lemma (Lemma 7) instead of the quantum one,
and treating a classical randomised protocol with complexity l as a [t, 0, l, . . . , l]A protocol,
we get the stronger classical lower bound of Ω(n1/tt−2).
Miltersen et al. [MNSW98] also apply their round elimination lemma to prove (classical)
lower bounds for other data structure problems and communication complexity problems.
We remark that we can extend all those results in a similar fashion to the quantum world.
6 Lower bounds for static membership
Consider the problem of storing a subset S of size at most n of the universe [m] in a table
with q cells, so that membership queries can be answered efficiently. We restrict the storage
scheme to be implicit, using at most p ‘pointer values’. A ‘pointer value’ is a member of
a set of size p (the set of ‘pointers’) disjoint from the universe. The term implicit means
that the storage scheme can store either a ‘pointer value’ or a member of S in a cell. In
particular, the storage scheme is not allowed to store an element of the universe which
is not a member of S. The query algorithm answers membership queries by performing
t (general) quantum cell probes. We call such schemes (p, q, t) implicit storage quantum
cell probe schemes. For universe sizes m that are ‘large’ compared to n, p, q, we can prove
an Ω(log n) lower bound on the number of quantum probes t required to solve the static
membership problem with (p, q, t) implicit storage quantum cell probe schemes. We start
with the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Suppose S is an n element subset of the universe [m], where m ≥ 2n+2. If the
storage scheme is implicit, always stores the same ‘pointer’ values in the same locations,
and in the remaining locations, stores the elements of S in a fixed order (repetitions of an
element are allowed, but all elements have to be stored) based on their relative ranking in
S, then Ω(log n) probes are needed by any bounded error quantum cell query strategy to
answer membership queries.
Proof: (Sketch) The proof follows by modifying Ambainis’s lower bound proof for quan-
tum ordered searching [Amb99]. There, it was shown that if S is stored in sorted order in
a table T then, given any query element q, Ω(log n) probes are required by any quantum
search strategy to find out the smallest index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that q ≤ T (i). We observe
that the lemma above does not follow directly from the result of Ambainis, since we only
need to decide if q is present in the table or not, and this is a weaker requirement. To
prove the lemma, we follow the adversary strategy of [Amb99] with some minor changes.
We study the behaviour of the quantum query scheme with query element n + 1. The
proof of Ambainis is based on a clever strategy of subdividing “intervals” (an interval is a
contiguous set of locations in the sorted table). We work instead with “logical intervals”,
where a logical interval denotes the set of locations in the table where elements contigu-
ous in the natural ordering are stored (as determined by the fixed storing order). After
this definition, one can easily show that the same subdivision strategy as in [Amb99] goes
through. In Ambainis’s proof, the adversary constructs inputs by padding with zeros from
21
the beginning up to the left of an interval, and with ones from the end up to the right of the
interval. Instead, we pad with small numbers (1, 2, . . .) from the logical beginning up to
the logical left of a logical interval, and with large numbers (m,m− 1, . . .) from the logical
end up to the logical right of the logical interval. We store the appropriate ‘pointer values’
in the ‘pointer locations’ (predetermined by the storing strategy). After doing this, one
can easily show that the same error analysis of [Amb99] goes through. Thus, the adversary
finally can produce two inputs, one of them containing n+ 1 and the other not, such that
the behaviour of the query scheme is very similar on both. This is a contradiction.
Remark: Høyer et al. also prove an Ω(log n) lower bound for quantum ordered search-
ing [HNS01]. But their approach, which is based on “distinguishing oracles”, does not
seem to be suitable for proving lower bounds for boolean valued functions. Hence to prove
Lemma 8, we modify the older Ω(log n) lower bound of Ambainis for quantum ordered
searching.
Theorem 3 For every n, p, q, there exists an N(n, p, q) such that for all m ≥ N(n, p, q),
the following holds: Consider any bounded error (p, q, t) implicit storage quantum cell probe
scheme for the static membership problem with universe size m and size of the stored subset
at most n. Then the quantum query scheme must make t = Ω(log n) probes.
Proof: (Sketch) Our proof follows from the Ramsey theoretic arguments of Yao [Yao81]
together with Lemma 8. The details are omitted.
7 Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we introduce the quantum cell probe model, a model for studying static data
structure problems in the quantum world. We show that the additional power of quantum
querying does not help for the static membership problem when the storage scheme is
restricted to be implicit, generalising a result of Yao. We also explore the possibility of
using quantum communication complexity to prove lower bounds in the quantum cell probe
model. We prove a round elimination lemma for quantum communication complexity and
use it to prove lower bounds for the static predecessor problem in a restricted version of the
quantum cell probe model, the address-only version. Extending this result to the general
model remains an important open problem. We also use the quantum round elimination
lemma to prove rounds versus communication tradeoffs for the ‘greater-than’ problem. It
would be interesting to find other applications of the round elimination lemma to quantum
communication complexity.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 6
In this section, we prove Lemma 6. The proof is somewhat similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4
in Klauck et al. [KNTZ01], but much simpler since we are in the classical setting. We first
state a theorem which will be required in the proof of Lemma 6. The quantum version
of this theorem, called the “average encoding theorem”, has been proved by Klauck et
al. [KNTZ01], who also use it in the proof of Lemma 4.4 in their paper. Intuitively speaking,
the theorem says that if the mutual information between a (classical) random variable
and its (classical) encoding is small, then the various probability distributions on the
codewords are close to the average probability distribution on the codewords. Below, the
notation ‖σ− ρ‖1 stands for the total variation distance (ℓ1 distance) between probability
distributions σ and ρ over the same sample space.
Theorem 4 (Average encoding, classical version, [KNTZ01]) Let X be a classical
random variable, which takes value x with probability px, and M be a classical randomised
encoding x 7→ σx of X, where σx is a probability distribution over the sample space of
codewords. The probability distribution of the average encoding is σ
∆
=
∑
x pxσx. Then
∑
x
px‖σx − σ‖1 ≤
√
(2 ln 2)I(X :M)
We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 Suppose f : E × F → G is a function. Let D be a probability distribution on
E × F , and P be a [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]A private coin classical randomised protocol for f . Let X
stand for the classical random variable denoting Alice’s input (under distribution D), M be
the first message of Alice in the protocol P , and I(X : M) denote the mutual information
between X and M under distribution D. Then there exists a [t−1, 0, l2, . . . , lt]B public coin
classical randomised protocol Q for f , such that
ǫQD ≤ ǫPD +
1
2
((2 ln 2)I(X :M))1/2
Proof: We first give an overview of the plan of the proof, before getting down to the
details. The proof proceeds in stages.
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Stage 1: Starting from P , we construct a [t, l1, . . . , lt]
A private coin protocol P ′, where
the first message is independent of Alice’s input, and ǫP
′
D ≤ ǫPD+(1/2)((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/2.
The important idea in this step is to first generate Alice’s message using a new private
coin without “looking” at her input, and after that, to adjust Alice’s old private coin in a
suitable manner so as to be consistent with her message and input.
Stage 2: Suppose the coin tosses in P ′ were done in public. Then Bob can generate the
first message of P ′ himself, as it is independent of Alice’s input. Doing this gives us a
[t− 1, l2, . . . , lt]B public coin protocol Q, such that ǫQx,y = ǫQ′x,y for every (x, y) ∈ E × F .
The protocolQ of Stage 2 is our desired [t−1, l2, . . . , lt]B public coin classical randomised
protocol for f . We have
ǫQD = ǫ
P ′
D ≤ ǫPD +
1
2
((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/2
We now give the details of the proof. Let σx be the probability distribution of the first
message M of protocol P when Alice’s input X = x. Let Y denote Bob’s input register.
Define σ
∆
=
∑
x pxσx, where px is the (marginal) probability of x under distribution D.
σ is the probability distribution of the average first message under distribution D. By
Theorem 4, we get that
∑
x
px‖σx − σ‖1 ≤
√
(2 ln 2)I(X :M)
For x ∈ E and an instance m of the first message of Alice, let qxmr denote the (condi-
tional) probability that the private coin toss of Alice results in r, given that Alice’s input
is x and her first message in protocol P is m. Let σ(m | x) denote the probability that the
first message of Alice in P is m, given that her input is x. Let σ(m) denote the probability
of m occurring in the average first message of Alice. Then, σ(m) =
∑
x pxσ(m | x).
Stage 1: We construct a [t, 0, l1, . . . , lt]
A private coin classical randomised protocol P ′
for f with average error under distribution D, ǫP
′
D ≤ ǫPD + (1/2)((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/2, and
where the probability distribution of the first message is independent of the input to Alice.
Suppose Alice is given x ∈ E and Bob is given y ∈ F . Alice tosses a fresh private coin
to pick m with probability σ(m). She then sets her old private coin to r with probability
qxmr . (If in P , message m cannot occur when Alice’s input is x, we say that protocol P
′
gives an error if such a thing happens.) After this, Alice and Bob behave as in protocol P
(henceforth, Alice ignores the new private coin which she had tossed to generate her first
message m). Hence in P ′, the probability distribution of the first message is independent
of Alice’s input.
Let us now compare the situations in protocols P and P ′ when Alice’s input is x, Bob’s
input is y, Alice has finished tossing her private coins, but no communication has taken
place as yet. In protocol P , the probability that Alice’s private coin toss results in r is∑
m
σ(m | x)qxmr
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In protocol P ′, the probability that Alice’s (old) private coin toss results in r is∑
m
σ(m)qxmr
Thus, the ℓ1 distance between the probability distributions on Alice’s (old) private coin
toss is
∑
r
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m
qxmr (σ(m | x)− σ(m))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ∑
r
∑
m
qxmr |σ(m | x)− σ(m)|
=
∑
m
(
|σ(m | x)− σ(m)|∑
r
qxmr
)
=
∑
m
|σ(m | x)− σ(m)|
= ‖σx − σ‖1
Hence, the error probability of P ′ on input x, y
ǫP
′
x,y ≤ ǫPx,y +
1
2
‖σx − σ‖1
Let qxy be the probability that (X, Y ) = (x, y) under distribution D. Then, the average
error of P ′ under distribution D, ǫP
′
D , is bounded by
ǫP
′
D =
∑
x,y
qxyǫ
P ′
x,y
≤ ∑
x,y
qxy
(
ǫPx,y +
1
2
‖σx − σ‖1
)
= ǫPD +
1
2
∑
x
px‖σx − σ‖1
≤ ǫPD +
1
2
((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/2
The last inequality follows from the “average encoding theorem” (Theorem 4).
Stage 2: We now construct our desired [t − 1, 0, l2, . . . , lt]B public coin classical ran-
domised protocol Q for f with ǫQD = ǫ
P ′
D . Suppose all the coin tosses of Alice and Bob in
P ′ were done publicly before any communication takes place. Now there is no need for the
first message from Alice to Bob, because Bob can reconstruct the message by looking at
the public coin tosses. This gives us the protocol Q, and trivially
ǫQD = ǫ
P ′
D ≤ ǫPD +
1
2
((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/2
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
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B Proof of Lemma 4
In this section, we prove Lemma 4. We first start with the definition of the trace norm of
linear operators, then state three theorems which will be required in the proof of Lemma 4,
and after that, we finally present the proof of Lemma 4.
For a linear operator A on a finite dimensional Hilbert space, the trace norm of A is
defined as ‖A‖t ∆= Tr
√
A†A. The following fundamental theorem (see [AKN98]) shows
that the trace distance between two density matrices ρ1, ρ2, ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖t, bounds how well
one can distinguish between ρ1, ρ2 by a measurement.
Theorem 5 ([AKN98]) Let ρ1, ρ2 be two density matrices on the same Hilbert space. Let
M be a general measurement (i.e. a POVM), and Mρi denote the probability distributions
on the (classical) outcomes of M got by performing measurement M on ρi. Let the ℓ1
distance between Mρ1 and Mρ2 be denoted by ‖Mρ1 −Mρ2‖1. Then
‖Mρ1 −Mρ2‖1 ≤ ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖t
In the proof of Lemma 4, we will need the following “average encoding theorem” of
Klauck et al. [KNTZ01]. Intuitively speaking, it says that if the mutual information be-
tween a classical random variable and its quantum encoding is small, then the various
quantum “codewords” are close to the “average codeword”.
Theorem 6 (Average encoding, quantum version, [KNTZ01]) Suppose X, Q are
two disjoint quantum systems, where X is a classical random variable, which takes value
x with probability px, and Q is a quantum encoding x 7→ σx of X. Let the density matrix
of the average encoding be σ
∆
=
∑
x pxσx. Then
∑
x
px‖σx − σ‖t ≤
√
(2 ln 2)I(X : Q)
We will also need the following “local transition theorem” of Klauck et al. [KNTZ01].
Theorem 7 (Local transition, [KNTZ01]) Let ρ1, ρ2 be two mixed states with support
in a Hilbert space H, K any Hilbert space of dimension at least the dimension of H, and
|φi〉 any purifications of ρi in H⊗ K. Then, there is a local unitary transformation U on
K that maps |φ2〉 to |φ′2〉 ∆= (I ⊗ U)|φ2〉 (I is the identity operator on H) such that
‖|φ1〉〈φ1| − |φ′2〉〈φ′2|‖t ≤ 2
√
‖ρ1 − ρ2‖t
We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 4. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4
in [KNTZ01], but with a careful accounting of “safe” overheads in the messages communi-
cated by Alice and Bob.
Lemma 4 Suppose f : E × F → G is a function. Let D be a probability distribution on
E × F , and P be a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]A safe coinless quantum protocol for f . Let X stand for
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the classical random variable denoting Alice’s input (under distribution D), M be the first
message of Alice in the protocol P , and I(X : M) denote the mutual information between
X and M under distribution D. Then there exists a [t− 1, c + l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe coinless
quantum protocol Q for f , such that
ǫQD ≤ ǫPD + ((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/4
Proof: We first give an overview of the plan of the proof, before getting down to the
details. The proof proceeds in stages. We remark on the similarities between the stages
in the quantum proof, and the stages in the classical proof (Lemma 6). Stages 1A and 1B
of the quantum proof together correspond to Stage 1 of the classical proof, and Stages 2A
and 2B of the quantum proof together correspond to Stage 2 of the classical proof.
Stage 1A: Starting from the [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe coinless protocol P , we construct a
[t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe coinless protocol P˜ with ǫP˜x,y = ǫ
P
x,y for every (x, y) ∈ E × F . P˜
contains an extra “secure” copy of Alice’s input x ∈ E, but is otherwise the same as P .
Stage 1B: Starting from P˜ , we construct a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe coinless protocol P ′,
where the first message is independent of Alice’s input, and ǫP
′
D ≤ ǫP˜D+((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/4.
The important idea in this step is to first generate Alice’s average message (which is
independent of her input), and after that, use the extra “secure” copy of Alice’s input x
to apply a unitary transformation Ux on some of her qubits without touching her message.
Ux is used to adjust Alice’s state in a suitable manner so as to be consistent with her input
and message. This “adjustment” step requires the use of the “local transition theorem”
(Theorem 7).
Stage 2A: Since in P ′ the first message is independent of Alice’s input, Bob can generate
it himself. But it is also necessary to achieve the correct entanglement between Alice’s
qubits and the first message. Bob does this by first sending a safe message of l1+ c qubits.
Alice then applies a unitary transformation Vx on some of her qubits, using the extra
“secure” copy of her input x, to achieve the correct entanglement. The existence of such
a Vx follows from Theorem 7. Doing all this gives us a [t + 1, c + l1, 0, 0, l2, . . . , lt]
B safe
coinless protocol Q′, such that ǫQ
′
x,y = ǫ
P ′
x,y for every (x, y) ∈ E × F .
Stage 2B: Since the first message of Alice in Q′ is zero qubits long, Bob can concatenate
his first two messages, giving us a [t − 1, c + l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe coinless protocol Q, such
that ǫQx,y = ǫ
Q′
x,y for every (x, y) ∈ E × F . The technical reason behind this is that unitary
transformations on disjoint sets of qubits commute.
The protocol Q of Stage 2B is our desired [t−1, c+ l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe coinless quantum
protocol for f . We have
ǫQD = ǫ
Q′
D = ǫ
P ′
D ≤ ǫP˜D + ((2 ln 2)I(X :M))1/4 = ǫPD + ((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/4
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We now give the details of the proof. Let σx be the density matrix of the first message
M of protocol P when Alice’s input X = x. Let Y denote Bob’s input register. Define
σ
∆
=
∑
x pxσx, where px is the (marginal) probability of x under distribution D. σ is the
density matrix of the average first message under distribution D. By the “secureness” of
P , σ is also the density matrix of the first message when |ψ〉 is fed to Alice’s input register
X , where |ψ〉 ∆= ∑x√px|x〉. By Theorem 6, we get that
∑
x
px‖σx − σ‖t ≤
√
(2 ln 2)I(X :M)
Stage 1A: We first construct a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe coinless quantum protocol P˜ for f
such that ǫP˜x,y = ǫ
P
x,y, for every (x, y) ∈ E × F . Let X be Alice’s input register in P . In P˜ ,
Alice has an additional register C, and the input x to Alice is fed to register C, instead of
X . X is initialised to |0〉 in P˜ . In protocol P˜ , Alice first copies the contents of C to X .
After that, things in P˜ proceed as in P . Register C is not touched henceforth, and thus,
C holds an extra “secure” copy of x throughout the run of protocol P˜ .
Stage 1B: We now construct a [t, c, l1, . . . , lt]
A safe coinless quantum protocol P ′ for f
with average error under distribution D, ǫP
′
D ≤ ǫP˜D + ((2 ln 2)I(X : M))1/4, and where the
density matrix of the first message is independent of the input x to Alice. Alice is given
x ∈ E and Bob is given y ∈ F . Consider the situation in P˜ after the first message has
been prepared by Alice, but before it is sent to Bob. Let register A denote Alice’s qubits
excluding the message qubits M and the qubits of the “secure” copy C (in particular, A
includes the qubits of register X). Without loss of generality, one can assume that register
A has at least l1 + c qubits, because one can initially pad up A with ancilla qubits set to
|0〉. Let |x〉C⊗|θx〉AM be the state vector of CAM in P˜ at this point, where the subscripts
denote the registers. |θx〉AM is a purification of σx. We note that |θx〉 is also the state vector
of AM in protocol P at this point. P ′ is similar to P˜ except for the following. Alice puts
|ψ〉 in register X (instead of copying C to X as in P˜ ) to create the first message in register
M with density matrix σ. AM now contains a purification |θ〉 of σ. Then Alice applies a
unitary transformation Ux depending upon x (which is available “securely” in register C)
on A, so that |θ′x〉AM ∆= (Ux ⊗ I)|θ〉AM is “close” to |θx〉AM . Here I stands for the identity
transformation on M . Theorem 7 tells us that there exists a unitary transformation Ux on
A such that
‖|θx〉〈θx| − |θ′x〉〈θ′x|‖t ≤ 2
√
‖σx − σ‖t
Thus, |x〉C ⊗ |θ′x〉AM is the state vector of CAM in P ′ after the application of Ux. Alice
then sends register M to Bob and after this, Alice and Bob behave as in P˜ . Application
of Ux does not affect the density matrix of register M , which continues to be σ. Hence in
P ′, the density matrix of the first message is independent of Alice’s input.
Let us now compare the situations in protocols P˜ and P ′ when Alice’s input is x, Bob’s
input is y, Alice has prepared her first message, but no communication has taken place
as yet. At this point, in both protocols P˜ and P ′, the state vector of Bob’s qubits is the
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same, and in tensor with the state vector of Alice’s qubits. Let B denote the register of
Bob’s qubits (including his input qubits Y ) and let |η〉B denote the state vector of B at
this point. Hence the global state of protocol P˜ at this point is |x〉C ⊗ |θx〉AM ⊗ |η〉B, and
the global state of P ′ is |x〉C ⊗ |θ′x〉AM ⊗ |η〉B. Therefore, the global states of protocols P˜
and P ′ at this point differ in trace distance by the quantity
‖|x〉〈x|⊗|θx〉〈θx|⊗|η〉〈η|−|x〉〈x|⊗|θ′x〉〈θ′x|⊗|η〉〈η|‖t = ‖|θx〉〈θx|−|θ′x〉〈θ′x|‖t ≤ 2
√
‖σx − σ‖t
Using Theorem 5, we see that the error probability of P ′ on input x, y
ǫP
′
x,y ≤ ǫP˜x,y +
1
2
‖|x〉〈x| ⊗ |θx〉〈θx| ⊗ |η〉〈η| − |x〉〈x| ⊗ |θ′x〉〈θ′x| ⊗ |η〉〈η|‖t ≤ ǫP˜x,y +
√
‖σx − σ‖t
Let qxy be the probability that (X, Y ) = (x, y) under distribution D. Then, the average
error of P ′ under distribution D, ǫP
′
D , is bounded by
ǫP
′
D =
∑
x,y
qxyǫ
P ′
x,y
≤ ∑
x,y
qxy
(
ǫP˜x,y +
√
‖σx − σ‖t
)
≤ ǫP˜D +
√∑
x,y
qxy‖σx − σ‖t
= ǫP˜D +
√∑
x
px‖σx − σ‖t
≤ ǫP˜D + ((2 ln 2)I(X :M))1/4
For the second inequality above, we use the concavity of the square root function. The
last inequality follows from the “average encoding theorem” (Theorem 6).
Stage 2A: We now construct a [t+1, c+l1, 0, 0, l2, . . . , lt]
B safe coinless quantum protocol
Q′ for f with ǫQ
′
x,y = ǫ
P ′
x,y, for all (x, y) ∈ E × F . Alice is given x ∈ E and Bob is given
y ∈ F . The protocol Q′ will be constructed from P ′. The input x is fed to register C of
Alice, and the input y is fed to register Y of Bob. Let register G denote all the qubits
of register A, except the last l1 + c qubits. In protocol Q
′ the registers initially in Alice’s
possession are C and G, and the registers initially in Bob’s possession are B, M , and a
new register R, where R is l1 + c qubits long. The qubits of G are initially set to |0〉.
Bob first prepares the state vector |η〉 in register B as in protocol P ′. He then constructs
a canonical purification of σ in registers MR. The density matrix of M is σ. Bob then
sends R to Alice. The density matrix of R is independent of the inputs x, y (in fact, if
the canonical purification in MR is the Schmidt purification, then the density matrix of
R is also σ). After receiving R, Alice treats GR as the register A in the remainder of the
protocol. AM now contains a purification of σ. Alice applies a unitary transformation
Vx depending upon x (which is available “securely” in register C) on A, so that the state
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vector of AM becomes |θ′x〉AM . The existence of such a Vx follows from Theorem 7. At
this point, the global state vector (over all the qubits of Alice and Bob) in Q′ is the same
as the global state vector in P ′ viz. |x〉C ⊗ |θ′x〉AM ⊗ |η〉B. Bob now treats register M as if
it were the first message of Alice in P ′, and proceeds to compute his response N of length
l2. Bob sends N to Alice and after this protocol Q
′ proceeds as in P ′. In Q′ Bob starts the
communication, the communication goes on for t + 1 rounds, the first message of Bob of
length l1+ c (i.e. register R) is a safe message, and the first message of Alice is zero qubits
long.
Stage 2B: We finally construct a [t− 1, c+ l1, l2, . . . , lt]B safe coinless quantum protocol
Q for f with ǫQx,y = ǫ
Q′
x,y, for all (x, y) ∈ E × F . In protocol Q, Bob (after doing the same
computations as in Q′) first sends as a single message register RN of length (l1+c)+l2, and
after that Alice applies Vx on A followed by her appropriate unitary transformation on AN
(the unitary transformation of Alice in Q′ on her qubits AN after she has received the first
two messages of Bob). At this point, the global state vector (over all the qubits of Alice
and Bob) in Q is the same as the global state vector in Q′, since unitary transformations
on disjoint sets of qubits commute. After this, things in Q proceed as in Q′. In protocol Q
Bob starts the communication, the communication goes on for t− 1 rounds, and the first
message of Bob of length (l1 + c) + l2 contains a safe overhead (the register R) of l1 + c
qubits.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
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